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The Justice and the Jury 
Jason Mazzone†
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Judges who work with juries—trial judges—tend to 
think very highly of them.1  Studies show that trial judges 
almost unanimously believe that juries reach fair verdicts; 
most trial judges report that if they personally were involved in 
a criminal or civil case they would want it to be decided by a 
jury.2  Judge William L. Dwyer, a judge for fifteen years on the 
United States District Court for the Western District of 
Washington in Seattle, considered jurors his “courtroom 
companions” who routinely produced “fair and honest 
verdicts.”3  Chief Judge Mark W. Bennett of the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Iowa states that it 
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 1 The favorable views held by trial judges contrast with commentators’ 
frequent criticisms of juries.  See, e.g., HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE 
AMERICAN JURY 5 (1966) (“‘[T]he jury trial at best is the apotheosis of the amateur.  
Why should anyone think that 12 persons brought in from the street, selected in 
various ways, for their lack of general ability, should have any special capacity for 
deciding controversies between persons?’”) (quoting Erwin Griswold, Dean’s Report 5-6 
(1963) (on file with Harvard Law School Library Special Collections)); Steven I. 
Friedland, The Competency and Responsibility of Jurors in Deciding Cases, 85 NW. U. 
L. REV. 190, 190 (1990) (“Numerous examples support the contention that a jury 
selected at random sometimes serves as an incompetent decisionmaker.”); Richard A. 
Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 1497 
(1999) (“Well-publicized instances of crazy jury trials—interminable, uncivil, lawless, 
resulting in outlandish verdicts and other egregious miscarriages of justice, or all these 
things at once—have convinced some observers that the American system is grossly 
inefficient.”).  But see VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 163 (1986) 
(“[T]he hard facts indicate that on the whole the jury behaves responsibly and 
rationally.”); William Glaberson, A Study’s Verdict: Jury Awards Are Not Out of 
Control, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2001, at A9 (reporting from a study of nearly 9,000 trials 
that judges award punitive damages about as often and in the same proportion as do 
juries). 
 2 See John B. Attanasio, Foreword: Juries Rule, 54 SMU L. REV. 1681, 1684-
85 (2001) (reporting results of a survey of federal and state trial judges in Texas). 
 3 WILLIAM L. DWYER, IN THE HANDS OF THE PEOPLE: THE TRIAL JURY’S 
ORIGINS, TRIUMPHS, TROUBLES, AND FUTURE IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, at xi, xiii  
(2002). 
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would be “catastrophic for the nation” if civil juries were to 
disappear.4  According to Nebraska trial judge Lyle Strom: 
“Out of hundreds of jury trials, I can count on fewer than the 
fingers of one hand the verdicts that I thought made no sense.”5  
How many of us would say the same about the decisions of the 
U.S. Supreme Court or other appellate courts? 
The justices of the Supreme Court do not sit with juries 
and therefore observe their work only by reading trial 
transcripts—transcripts in cases in which the losing party is 
arguing that the outcome of the case was flawed.  Yet Supreme 
Court decisions heavily influence the work of juries: the tasks 
juries will be called upon to perform6 and how labor will be 
divided up between judges and juries;7 how jurors are selected;8 
the evidence juries see and the arguments they hear;9 the 
  
 4 Mark W. Bennett, Judges’ Views on Vanishing Civil Trials, 88 JUDICATURE 
306, 308 (2005).  
 5 Quoted in DWYER, supra note 3, at 137. 
 6 For example, in the modern era at least, “in the absence of express or 
implied consent to the contrary, issues of law are to be resolved by the court and issues 
of fact are to be determined by the jury under appropriate instructions by the court.” 
Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935).  
 7 For example, in the criminal context, the Court has held that defendants 
have a right to have a jury decide every element of the crime.  See United States v. 
Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995) (“We have held that [the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments] require criminal convictions to rest upon a jury determination that the 
defendant is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a 
reasonable doubt.” (emphasis added)).  A series of recent cases limit the ability of 
judges to make their own factual findings at sentencing.  See United States v. Booker, 
543 U.S. 220, 230-32, 34 (2005) (holding that Sixth Amendment was violated by 
imposition of an enhanced sentence under the United States Sentencing Guidelines 
based on the sentencing judge’s determination of facts other than a prior conviction 
that were not found by the jury or admitted by the defendant); Blakely v. Washington, 
542 U.S. 296, 313-14 (2004) (invalidating state sentencing law that allowed judge to 
impose sentence beyond standard range upon finding aggravating factors, in this case 
that the defendant acted with deliberate cruelty); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 588-89 
(2002) (holding unconstitutional state statute that allowed the trial judge sitting alone 
to decide whether there existed aggravating factors to warrant the imposition of the 
death penalty); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (holding that “[o]ther 
than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime 
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt”).  See generally Suja A. Thomas, Judicial Modesty and the 
Jury, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 767, 795 (2005) (concluding that “the [Supreme] Court has 
been more generous in its allocation of power to the criminal jury under the Sixth 
Amendment as compared to its allocation of power to the civil jury under the Seventh 
Amendment”).  
 8 See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (holding that 
prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges to remove potential jurors solely on the basis 
of their race violates equal protection). 
 9 See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595-97 (1993) 
(holding that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 requires trial judges to act as gatekeepers 
to ensure that scientific expert testimony presented to a jury is both reliable and 
relevant). 
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consequences of jury deadlock;10 and, of course, whether jury 
verdicts will be overturned or left in tact.11  What the justices 
think of juries, then, is a matter of importance. 
This Article examines Justice Harry A. Blackmun’s view 
of juries.  A close reading of Blackmun’s opinions and of 
opinions by other justices that Blackmun joined demonstrates 
that Blackmun had a view of juries that, at least in modern 
times, is unusual.  Blackmun saw juries as important but not 
for the typical reasons.  He did not think juries were especially 
remarkable as fact-finding bodies: juries, in his view, were not 
needed to find facts accurately and, worse, they could easily get 
facts wrong.  Blackmun also did not think of juries in terms of 
individual rights: he placed little emphasis on the criminal jury 
trial as a right of defendants and he did not consider juries to 
be in court principally to protect the defendant’s interests. 
Instead, Blackmun saw juries primarily as an element 
of democratic government.  Here, too, Blackmun’s view was 
unusual.  Blackmun placed some stock—though not as much as 
some of his other colleagues on the Court—in juries’ serving 
democracy by preventing government overreaching and 
protecting liberty.12  But for Blackmun, the main democratic 
  
 10 See, e.g., Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501-02 (1896) (holding that 
there was no error when a criminal jury returned for further instructions and the trial 
court judge instructed the jurors that “if much the larger number were for conviction, a 
dissenting juror should consider whether his doubt was a reasonable one which made 
no impression upon the minds of so many men, equally honest, equally intelligent with 
himself,” and “[i]f . . . the majority were for acquittal, the minority ought to ask 
themselves whether they might not reasonably doubt the correctness of a judgment 
which was not concurred in by the majority”).  The Court has stated that the propriety 
of administering an Allen charge to a deadlocked jury is “beyond dispute.”  Lowenfield 
v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 237 (1988). 
 11 See, e.g., Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 434-35 (1994) (holding 
that in the absence of sufficient alternative due process safeguards, state constitutional 
provision preventing judicial review of the amount of punitive damages imposed by a 
civil jury violated the Fourteenth Amendment unless the reviewing court could 
affirmatively say there was no evidence to support the verdict); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 
508 U.S. 275, 277 (1993) (“[A]lthough a judge may direct a verdict for the defendant [in 
a criminal case] if the evidence is legally insufficient to establish guilt, he may not 
direct a verdict for the State, no matter how overwhelming the evidence”); Jackson v. 
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979) (“[T]he critical inquiry on [appellate] review of 
the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction . . . is whether, after 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of 
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”); 
McCaughn v. Real Estate Land Title & Trust Co., 297 U.S. 606, 608 (1936) (stating 
that in reviewing a civil jury’s verdict “[t]he appellate court cannot pass upon the 
weight of [the] evidence” (citations omitted)); Hansen v. Boyd, 161 U.S. 397, 402 (1896) 
(noting that an alleged assignment of error  that “ask[ed the Court] to determine the 
weight of proof . . . usurp[ed] the province of the [civil] jury”).  
 12 See infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text. 
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benefit of the jury was as a participatory institution.13  Like 
voting, Blackman viewed serving on a jury as a right and a 
responsibility of citizenship.14  Blackmun therefore saw it as his 
job, as a justice on the Supreme Court, to make sure that the 
jury operated properly as a participatory democratic 
institution.15  In particular, whatever other rules the Supreme 
Court might make about juries, it had to ensure at least that 
juries were open to all citizens.16
Parts II and III of the Article explore Blackmun’s 
democratic view of juries.  Part II traces Blackmun’s 
disagreement, expressed in a series of cases, with conventional 
accounts of why juries are valuable.  Part III examines 
Blackmun’s own view of juries as robust sites of democratic 
participation.  
Understanding how Blackmun viewed juries does more 
than shed light on the jurisprudence of a former member of the 
Supreme Court.  Taken seriously, Blackmun’s insights about 
juries have important, and troubling, implications for the 
present state of American democracy, the subject of Part IV.  In 
addition to pointing to some needed reforms in jury practices, 
Blackmun’s approach suggests that the recent phenomenon of 
the vanishing jury trial represents a disappearance of 
democracy itself.  
II.  THE VALUES OF JURIES 
Why juries?  Three reasons are commonly offered for 
why juries are valuable.  First, juries are good at finding facts: 
twelve people who listen to evidence and then deliberate 
together over what they have heard are more likely to get 
things right than is a single fact-finder deciding an issue 
alone.17  Second, juries, particularly in criminal cases, serve as 
  
 13 See infra Part III. 
 14 See id. 
 15 See id. 
 16 See infra notes 85-147 and accompanying text. 
 17 See, e.g., Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. 
REV. 777, 827 (2001) (“Juries consist of groups, and group deliberation might reduce 
some illusions of judgment. . . . [For example, b]ecause groups usually remember more 
of the relevant facts than individuals, group decision making can mitigate some of the 
hindsight bias’s influence, suggesting that juries might more successfully avoid the 
hindsight bias than judges.” (footnote omitted)); Saul Levmore, From Cynicism to 
Positive Theory in Public Choice, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 375, 375 & n.1 (2002) (describing 
the Condorcet Jury Theorem as stating that “a large number of observers will do better 
than any non-expert individuals, so that it is comforting to be part of a group because 
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a check on the government: criminal juries watch out for the 
rights and interests of the individual defendant, and, as a 
result, safeguard liberty more generally by shielding other 
people from future government abuses.18  Third, juries 
legitimize outcomes:  the general public is more likely to 
respect decisions reached by ordinary citizens.  In civil cases, 
verdicts reflect the views of the community; a jury verdict in a 
criminal case is fair because it is the decision of the defendant’s 
peers.19
Consider, then, what Justice Blackmun thought of these 
three rationales.  Justice Blackmun clearly did not think the 
reason for having juries was that they accurately find facts.  
Three important cases illustrate Blackmun’s view on this issue: 
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania (1971),20 Codispoti v. Pennsylvania 
(1974),21 and Ludwig v. Massachusetts (1976).22   
In McKeiver, the Supreme Court held that there is no 
right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to a jury trial in a state court juvenile delinquency 
proceeding.23  Writing for a plurality, Justice Blackmun 
avoided the question of whether a juvenile proceeding is a 
  
the group can correct the misimpressions of the individuals”); Michael J. Saks, Book 
Review: Blaming the Jury, 75 GEO. L.J. 693, 706-07 (1986) (reviewing VALERIE P. HANS 
& NEIL WIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY (1986)) (writing that studies “give[] us reason to 
wonder if juries will not be superior to judges in complex cases” including because the 
“jury represents the reliable middle ground between judges who will range from 
excellent to poor at complex factfinding” (footnotes omitted)). 
 18 See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000) (stating that 
trial by jury “‘guard[s] against a spirit of oppression and tyranny on the part of rulers’” 
and is “‘the great bulwark of civil and political liberties’” (quoting 2 J. STORY, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 540-41 (4th Ed. 1873))); 
Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 157 (1973) (stating that “the purpose of the jury trial 
in criminal cases [is] to prevent government oppression and, in criminal and civil cases, 
to assure a fair and equitable resolution of factual issues”); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 
U.S. 145, 155 (1968) (“A right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to 
prevent oppression by the Government.”). 
 19 See, e.g., Leslie Ellis & Shari Seidman Diamond, Race, Diversity and Jury 
Composition: Battering and Bolstering Diversity, 78 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1033, 1039 
(2003) (“To the extent that the jury legitimizes the verdict to the public, it builds public 
confidence in the legal system as a whole.”); Nancy Gertner, Book Review: Is the Jury 
Worth Saving?, 75 B.U. L. REV. 923, 924 (1995) (reviewing STEPHEN J. ADLER, THE 
JURY: TRIAL AND ERROR IN THE AMERICAN COURTROOM (1994)) (“[The jury] make[s] 
critical, and presumably accurate, decisions about central social issues, at the same 
time that it legitimizes those decisions by providing for the most representative lay 
participation.”); Stephan Landsman, Appellate Courts and Civil Juries, 70 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 873, 884 (2002) (“Juries powerfully help to legitimize judicial activity.”). 
 20 403 U.S. 528 (1971). 
 21 418 U.S. 506 (1974). 
 22 427 U.S. 618 (1976). 
 23 403 U.S. at 551. 
40 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:1 
criminal proceeding for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right 
to a jury trial and he wrote instead that while juveniles are 
entitled to a fact-finding process that comports with due 
process, due process itself does not require fact-finding to be 
conducted by a jury.24  “[O]ne cannot say,” Blackmun explained, 
“that in our legal system the jury is a necessary component of 
accurate factfinding.  There is much to be said for it, to be sure, 
but we . . . [are] content to pursue other ways for determining 
facts.”25  Elsewhere, Blackmun noted that the jury performs “no 
particular magic.”26  In other words, a process can be a fair 
process, and produce accurate results, even when a jury is not a 
part of the proceeding.27   
Moreover, Blackmun reasoned, in juvenile proceedings, 
not only will a jury be unnecessary to accurately find facts, 
something that can be done perfectly well by a judge, a jury in 
such cases will have a negative effect: the jury will turn the 
juvenile court into a full-blown adversarial proceeding, 
undermining the role of the juvenile court in protecting and 
nurturing young people.28  The jury, then, is not needed to find 
facts and will likely only get in the way. 
In Codispoti, the Court, in a majority opinion by Justice 
White, held that following the verdict, a criminal defendant 
facing contempt charges for conduct during the course of a trial 
is entitled to a jury under the Sixth Amendment if the 
aggregate sentence for the contempt charges exceeds six 
months.29  Dissenting from the majority’s extension of the Sixth 
  
 24 Id. at 543-45.  The case involved two juveniles from Pennsylvania: Joseph 
McKeiver, aged sixteen, was charged in family court with robbery, larceny, and 
receiving stolen goods.  Id. at 534-35.  Rejecting his request for a jury trial, the judge 
found him to be a juvenile delinquent and ordered probation.  Id. at 535 & 558 
(Douglas, J., dissenting).  Fifteen-year old Edward Terry, charged with assault and 
battery on a police officer and conspiracy, also sought a jury trial.  Id. at 535 (majority 
opinion).  Again denying the request, the judge determined Terry was a delinquent and 
ordered him committed to a home for youths.  Id.  A companion case decided from 
North Carolina heard along with McKeiver involved a group of Black children charged 
with disorderly conduct for protesting schooling conditions—also adjudged delinquents 
without the benefit of a jury trial.  Id. at 536-38.  The state judge in that case ordered 
the children in the custody of the state Department of Welfare but suspended the order 
on the condition that the children refrain from further infractions, report monthly to a 
welfare officer, and attend school without further disruption.  Id. at 537-38.   
 25 Id. at 543.  Blackmun explained: “Juries are not required, and have not 
been, for example, in equity cases, in workmen's compensation, in probate, or in 
deportation cases.  Neither have they been generally used in military trials.”  Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. at 547. 
 29 418 U.S. at 514-18. 
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Amendment jury right, Blackmun saw no reason why a judge, 
acting alone, cannot determine whether the defendant is guilty 
of contempt as a result of conduct during the course of the 
trial.30  Blackmun wrote: “the contempt [takes] place in open 
court and the incident and all its details are fully preserved on 
the trial record.”31  A judge, then, can review the record and 
make appropriate findings of fact.32  Blackmun reasoned that 
any bias on the part of the trial judge could be dealt with by 
assigning the contempt case to a new judge.33  Blackmun 
therefore stated that he was “at a loss . . . to see the role a jury 
is to perform.”34  More generally, Blackmun urged, “[t]he 
determination of whether basically undisputed facts constitute 
a direct criminal contempt is a particularly inappropriate task 
for the jury,” and the job should instead be “the exclusive 
province of the court.”35  Blackmun reasoned that since the jury 
would not be responsible for determining the sentence on the 
contempt charges, there was nothing it could ever do to 
“mitigat[e] an excessive punishment.”36  Hence, the jury was 
not needed.37
Even in a straight-up criminal trial, Blackmun did not 
consider a jury essential to accurate fact-finding.  In our third 
case, Ludwig v. Massachusetts, decided in 1976, Blackmun 
stated in his majority opinion that “[t]here is no 
question . . . that a person who is accused of crime may receive 
a fair trial before a magistrate or a judge.”38  Accordingly, in 
Ludwig, Blackmun held constitutional a two-tier criminal 
system in Massachusetts in which a defendant is tried in the 
first tier before a judge, but is entitled to appeal a conviction to 
the second tier and be tried there de novo by a jury.39  Brushing 
  
 30 Id. at 522 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. at 522-23. 
 34 Id. at 522. 
 35 Codispoti, 418 U.S. at 523. 
 36 Id. at 523. 
 37 By contrast, twenty years later, Blackmun held for a unanimous court that 
a union could not be held in contempt for violating a labor injunction and fined in the 
amount of $52 million without the benefit of a jury trial.  International Union, United 
Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 839 (1994).  The fine, Blackmun reasoned (in 
part of his opinion joined by six other justices), was punitive rather than compensatory 
and while not all criminal contempt fines require a jury trial, here the magnitude of 
the amount made it a serious criminal sanction and triggered the Sixth Amendment.  
Id. at 837-38 & n.5. 
 38 427 U.S. at 627 n.3.  
 39 Id. at 631-32. 
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aside the petitioner’s arguments—that the Massachusetts 
system burdens the defendant with delay, expense and 
inconvenience; subjects the defendant to the risk of a harsher 
sentence if tried a second time and convicted at the second tier; 
and is a form of double jeopardy—Blackmun reasoned that the 
availability of a jury, even if only after the first trial ran its 
course, satisfied the Constitution’s requirements.40   
Justice Blackmun, thus, did not place much stock in the 
commonly held view that juries are valuable because they are 
good at finding facts.  How about the second reason frequently 
offered in support of juries—their value in keeping government 
in check and protecting liberty?  Blackmun’s colleague, Byron 
White, was enthusiastic about juries as a curb on government 
power, and Blackmun joined opinions by White explaining how 
juries exist as a safeguard against arbitrary government 
action.  For example, in 1972, in Apodaca v. Oregon,41 the Court 
affirmed three defendants’ state felony convictions following 
non-unanimous verdicts (as permitted under state law)—
eleven-to-one verdicts in the cases of two of the defendants and 
a ten-to-two verdict in the other.42  Blackmun joined White’s 
plurality opinion in Apodaca concluding that the Sixth 
Amendment does not require a unanimous twelve-person jury 
verdict because unanimity does not “materially contribute” to 
the “purpose of trial by jury . . . to prevent oppression by the 
Government” by “interpos[ing] between the accused and his 
accuser . . . the commonsense judgment of a group of laymen.”43  
Ten jurors agreeing on an outcome, held the plurality, is 
enough commonsense to protect liberty.44
Yet, despite Apodaca, Blackmun placed less importance 
than did White on the role of juries in curbing government 
overreaching.  In Codispoti, White understood that the 
arbitrary exercise of government power, the thing the jury 
exists to prevent, might be the exercise of power by the trial 
judge—who is, of course, a government employee.  Giving the 
case to the jury, White stated, reduces “the likelihood of 
arbitrary action” that exists when the judge, after the trial is 
  
 40 Id. at 624-32.  In other cases, Blackmun also pointed out that juries were 
prone to make mistakes.  See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 926-27 (1983) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (discussing how jurors are easily misled by scientific 
evidence). 
 41 406 U.S. 404 (1972). 
 42 Id. at 405-06, 414. 
 43 Id. at 410. 
 44 Id. at 411. 
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over, is able to file a series of contempt charges and that same 
judge, or another judge in the same building, determines guilt 
or innocence on those contempt charges and imposes a sentence 
that might run several years.”45
Indeed, by dissenting from White’s opinion, Blackmun 
did not appear to recognize the general resemblance Codispoti 
bore to the most famous instance of juries protecting liberties: 
the prosecution of John Peter Zenger in New York in 1735 on 
charges of seditious libel for having published in his newspaper 
criticisms of corrupt New York Governor William Cosby.46  In 
the Zenger trial, the court instructed the jury that the only 
thing for it to do was to decide, as a factual matter, whether the 
defendant published the newspapers in question and, if so, 
return a verdict of guilty.47  Rejecting the argument of Andrew 
Hamilton, Zenger’s Philadelphia lawyer, that the jury should 
also decide whether the offending newspapers were libelous 
and whether the defense of truth applied, the court stated that 
it would determine—if the jury found Zenger published the 
materials—whether they were libelous, and, if they were, 
impose an appropriate sentence.48  Zenger had admitted he 
published the newspapers and so a guilty verdict seemed 
inevitable in the case.49  Yet the jury, present in the courtroom 
throughout the exchanges between the judge and Hamilton, 
returned an acquittal.50  Despite its limited mandate, the 
Zenger jury protected the right to publish from an abusive 
government. 
So too in Codispoti (and other cases involving charges of 
criminal contempt) the jury might serve to protect liberty.  
Though the jury would see the defendant’s misconduct on the 
record, and though the evidence of criminal contempt might be 
overwhelmingly clear, the jury might nonetheless acquit.  It 
might conclude, for example, that the government—in the form 
of the angry trial judge—had gone too far in seeking contempt 
sanctions.  It might decide that a finding of contempt would be 
unfair.  It might oppose the government having a second 
chance to incarcerate a defendant.  Viewed from the 
  
 45 Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 515-16 (1974). 
 46 See generally A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRYAL OF JOHN PETER 
ZENGER (1736), available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/history/zenger.htm. 
 47 Id. at 29. 
 48 Id. at 18-19. 
 49 Id. at 12. 
 50 Id. at 30. 
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perspective of the Zenger case, Blackmun overlooked the 
important safeguard to liberty juries might offer in these 
circumstances. 
A third common rationale for the jury system is that 
juries lend legitimacy to verdicts.  Blackmun also did not seem 
to consider this to be the importance of the jury.  For one, 
Blackmun plainly saw a significant role for the judge in 
keeping the jury in check.  Blackmun wrote the majority 
opinion in Smith v. United States,51 holding that under the 
provision of federal law prohibiting the mailing of obscene 
materials,52 and in accordance with Miller v. California,53 it is 
the job of the jury to apply the standards of its own community 
to determine whether material is obscene.54  At the same time, 
Blackmun emphasized in Smith, judges had an important role 
in monitoring the jury’s work.  The trial judge should ensure 
that jurors are “instructed properly, so that they consider the 
entire community and not simply their own subjective 
reactions, or the reactions of a sensitive or of a callous 
minority.”55  Blackmun further instructed that judges also 
should determine if the material falls within the substantive 
limits of Miller56 and noted that an issue “particularly 
amenable to appellate review” in obscenity cases was the Miller 
prong that asks whether the material had redeeming literary, 
artistic, political, or scientific value.57  More generally, 
Blackmun wrote, “it is always appropriate for the appellate 
court to review the sufficiency of the evidence.”58  Hence, juries 
bring the voice of the community to the courtroom—but the 
judge decides how strong that voice will be. 
It comes, then, as no surprise that Blackmun was the 
author of the Court’s Daubert opinion, holding that under the 
  
 51 431 U.S. 291 (1977). 
 52 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (2000). 
 53 413 U.S. 15 (1973).  Miller held that material can be obscene only if: 
(a) the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would 
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) the 
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct 
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) the work, taken as a 
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 
Id. at 25. 
 54 Smith, 431 U.S. at 304-05. 
 55 Id. at 305. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. at 305-06. 
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Federal Rules of Evidence, before expert scientific testimony is 
presented to a jury the trial judge must make a preliminary 
assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology 
underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and can be 
applied to the facts at issue in the case.59  While recognizing 
that this gatekeeping role of judges “inevitably on occasion will 
prevent the jury from learning of authentic insights and 
innovations,” Blackmun explained that evidentiary rules are 
“designed not for the exhaustive search for cosmic 
understanding but for the particularized resolution of legal 
disputes.”60  
Blackmun’s skepticism towards the value that juries 
hold in lending legitimacy to verdicts can also be seen in his 
death penalty jurisprudence.  Every death penalty case 
receives enormous public attention and presents an especially 
strong risk that its outcome will be perceived as illegitimate, 
particularly because the cost of error is so high.  While 
Blackmun would ultimately conclude capital punishment was 
unconstitutional,61 in the earlier cases in which he voted to 
uphold a capital sentence, he did not think that a jury had to 
be entrusted with the task of deciding whether death was an 
appropriate penalty.  In 1984, in Spaziano v. Florida,62 Justice 
Blackmun wrote the majority opinion holding that no 
constitutional violation occurs if, in accordance with state law, 
the trial judge in a first-degree murder case overrides the jury’s 
recommendation of life imprisonment and imposes a death 
sentence.63  In Spaziano, the judge, as required under the 
Florida statute, independently found that there existed 
aggravating circumstances—the murder was heinous and 
atrocious and the defendant had committed a prior violent 
felony—that justified ignoring the jury’s decision and imposing 
a capital sentence.64  Blackmun saw no problem with judges 
ignoring a jury’s decision in these circumstances.  He explained 
that “a capital sentencing proceeding involves the same 
fundamental issue involved in any other sentencing 
proceeding—a determination of the appropriate punishment to 
  
 59 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993). 
 60 Id. at 597. 
 61 See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) (“From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of 
death.”). 
 62 468 U.S. 447 (1984). 
 63 Id. at 449. 
 64 Id. at 451-52. 
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be imposed on an individual,” and that this was an issue to 
which the Sixth Amendment jury right simply does not apply.65  
The Constitution, Blackmun reasoned, mandates only that a 
capital sentencing scheme be generally in accordance with the 
“twin objectives” of “measured, consistent application and 
fairness to the accused.”66  A judge having the final word 
comports with those requirements: “Nothing in those twin 
objectives suggests that the sentence must or should be 
imposed by a jury.”67
Blackmun was not persuaded by the petitioner’s 
arguments that the “[t]he imposition of the death penalty . . . is 
an expression of community outrage,” that jurors are “in the 
best position to decide whether a particular crime is so heinous 
that the community’s response must be death,” and that the 
decision of the jury should therefore be final,68 points pressed 
by Justice Stevens.69  Instead, Blackmun reasoned, the state 
legislature, in creating the particular death penalty scheme in 
the first place, had already given voice to the concerns of the 
community.70  Legitimacy, in other words, derived from the 
statute itself.  Though assuring readers that his opinion “do[es] 
not denigrate the significance of the jury’s role as a link 
between the community and the penal system and as a 
bulwark between the accused and the State,”71 Blackmun 
concluded that the Constitution permits judges, in accordance 
with the state’s own laws, to ignore the jury’s recommendation: 
“advice,” he wrote, “does not become a judgment simply 
because it comes from the jury.”72  Moreover, if the sentencing 
judge’s determination is irrational or arbitrary, there remains 
the possibility of correction on appeal.73  Blackmun believed 
that even in capital cases, in which legitimacy seems most 
crucial, juries could be displaced.   
  
 65 Id. at 459. 
 66 Id. (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110-11 (1982)). 
 67 Id. at 460. 
 68 Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 461. 
 69 Id. at 481-90 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 70 Id. at 462 (majority opinion). 
 71 Id. at 462. 
 72 Id. at 465. 
 73 Id. at 466-67. 
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III.  THE JURY AND DEMOCRACY 
Though Justice Blackmun placed little emphasis on 
juries as accurate fact finders, guardians of liberty, and a 
source of legitimacy, he nonetheless valued juries—for a 
different reason.  Blackmun considered juries an important 
component of democracy.  In this view, juries matter because 
they represent an opportunity for citizens to participate in the 
workings of government.  Like voting, jury service is a right 
and obligation of citizenship.  Juries in this sense promote 
liberty, but not so much because any particular jury keeps the 
government in check or a jury watches out for the interests of a 
particular defendant.  Rather, juries safeguard liberty because 
they are an aspect of a functioning democracy.  The job of the 
Supreme Court, then, is to ensure juries are open for and 
conducive to participation—just as the Court safeguards the 
ability of citizens to vote. 
Under this approach, juries must function as 
participatory bodies.  A series of Supreme Court cases 
considered how the numerical composition of a jury affects its 
ability to function.  In 1978, in Ballew v. Georgia,74 Blackmun 
wrote for the Court in holding that a five-member jury in a 
criminal case violated the Sixth Amendment.75  The jury’s 
democratic purpose, Blackmun wrote, is only achieved by “the 
participation of the community in determinations of guilt 
and . . . the application of the common sense of laymen.”76  In 
1970 (before Justice Blackmun’s tenure) the Court had held in 
Williams v. Florida that a jury comprised of six citizens is 
constitutional.77  Why then, were six jurors permissible in 
Williams while in Ballew five jurors were not?  Citing a vast 
body of scholarly work on jury size prepared in the wake of 
Williams,78 Blackmun concluded that a series of problems 
emerge if the number of jurors drops below six.  Small-sized 
groups do not function well as deliberative bodies, Blackmun 
concluded.79  Collectively, the members of very small groups 
have less reliable recall of evidence compared to larger groups; 
very small groups do not effectively solve problems; biases of 
  
 74 435 U.S. 223 (1978). 
 75 Id. at 245. 
 76 Id. at 229 (emphasis added). 
 77 399 U.S. 78 (1970). 
 78 Ballew, 435 U.S. at 231 n.10. 
 79 Id. at 232. 
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individuals are not tempered in small groups; minority 
viewpoints are also less likely to be asserted because 
individuals are reluctant to articulate views if nobody else in 
the group shares the view; and very small groups of decision-
makers produce inaccurate results.80  Moreover, Blackmun 
emphasized, as the size of the jury decreases, its benefit as a 
site of community participation naturally declines81 in that the 
“opportunity for meaningful and appropriate representation . . . 
decrease[s] with the size of the panel[].”82  
Consistent with his approach to jury size and 
deliberation in Ballew, in 1979, Blackmun joined Rehnquist’s 
opinion in Burch v. Louisiana, holding that a non-unanimous 
six-person jury was unconstitutional.83  In 1980, in Brown v. 
Louisiana, Blackmun also joined Brennan’s opinion—which 
itself drew heavily on Ballew—in holding that the Burch rule 
applied retroactively.84
Because juries are sites of democratic participation, 
Blackmun further saw his job as ensuring that jury 
participation is available to all citizens.  As a judge on the 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Blackmun had already 
issued an important ruling on the unconstitutionality of 
excluding Black citizens from juries.  In 1961, in Bailey v. 
Henslee,85 Circuit Judge Blackmun held that the Equal 
Protection Clause required granting a habeas petitioner from 
Arkansas a new trial following his conviction by an all-White 
jury, and death sentence, when the method for selecting jurors 
involved jury commissioners who handpicked the jurors; the 
jurors’ race was notated in the records; Black jurors rarely 
served; and there was a recurrence in jury pools of the same 
few Black citizens who would likely be disqualified.86 “When a 
right to a jury trial exists,” Circuit Judge Blackmun wrote, “a 
jury’s proper composition is fundamental.”87   
  
 80 Id. at 232-37. 
 81 Id. at 236-37. 
 82 Id. at 237. 
 83 441 U.S. 130, 134 (1979). 
 84 447 U.S. 323, 330 (1980).  Note that in Apodaca, Justice White, in an 
opinion joined by Blackmun holding that the state can permit a verdict upon the vote of 
ten or eleven out of twelve jurors, explained also that the participatory aspect of juries 
is not undermined because the jury began as twelve citizens, selected from a 
representative pool.  Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 412-14. 
 85 287 F.2d 936 (8th Cir. 1961).  
 86 Id. at 947-48. 
 87 Id. at 941 (footnote omitted). 
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At the Supreme Court, in Taylor v. Louisiana,88 
Blackmun joined White’s opinion holding that a male criminal 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right is violated when, in 
accordance with state law, women were called for jury service 
only if they have previously filed a declaration indicating they 
want to serve—a system that resulted in a very small number 
of women in the jury pool.89  If juries are to protect against 
arbitrary governmental power, White reasoned, the jury pool 
must reflect a fair cross-section of the population.90  White 
noted also in Taylor that “[c]ommunity participation in the 
administration of the criminal law” is part of “our democratic 
heritage.”91  A jury representative of the community, White 
stated, ensures “diffused impartiality,” and that the “civic 
responsibility” of “administ[ering] . . . justice” is “shar[ed].”92  
Solidifying this approach, in 1977, Blackmun wrote the 
majority opinion in Castaneda v. Partida,93 a habeas case, in 
which the Court found a Fourteenth Amendment equal 
protection violation when a defendant had been indicted by a 
Texas grand jury selected through an exclusionary process.94  
Under the key-man system in place in Texas, a state judge 
appointed three to five persons to serve as jury commissioners; 
they in turn selected fifteen to twenty individuals from the 
county to make up the list from which the grand jury was 
drawn.95  Blackmun held that the petitioner had made out a 
prima facie case of intentional discrimination in the grand jury 
selection by showing that in a county in which 79.1% of the 
population was Mexican-American, only 39% of people 
summoned for grand jury service over an 11-year period were 
Mexican-American.96  Blackmun also held that the state’s claim 
that Mexican-Americans constituted a majority of elected 
officials in the county was insufficient evidence to rebut the 
prima facie showing.97  Equal protection requires inclusiveness 
in choosing grand juries as well as petit juries.   
  
 88 419 U.S. 522 (1975). 
 89 Id. at 525-26, 533. 
 90 Id. at 530. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. at 530-31 (citation omitted). 
 93 430 U.S. 482 (1977). 
 94 Id. at 501. 
 95 Id. at 484. 
 96 Id. at 486-91, 494-96. 
 97 Id. at 499-501. 
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Two cases decided in 1979 further demonstrate 
Blackmun’s commitment toward ensuring jury inclusiveness.    
In Duren v. Missouri, Blackmun joined White again to hold 
that a Missouri statute that granted women automatic 
exemption from jury service, thereby producing under-
representation of women on jury venires, violated the 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights.98  That same year, 
Blackmun wrote for a majority in Rose v. Mitchell,99 holding 
that racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause in the selection of a grand jury is a basis for setting 
aside a criminal conviction, even when the verdict is reached by 
a properly constituted petit jury, and, further, that the issue 
can be raised in a federal habeas petition.100  The case involved 
two Black defendants convicted in Tennessee of murder who 
claimed in their habeas petitions that the grand jury array, 
appointed through a key-man system in which three jury 
commissioners compiled a list of potential jurors, and the grand 
jury foreperson, appointed by the county court, had been 
selected in a racially discriminatory manner.101  After an 
evidentiary hearing, the federal district court dismissed the 
petitions on the ground that no showing of discrimination had 
been made.102  The Court of Appeals reversed on the issue of 
the selection of the jury foreperson, and vacated the 
convictions, and the Supreme Court granted review on that 
same issue.103  
In his opinion in Rose, Blackmun wrote that “[f]or 
nearly a century, this Court in an unbroken line of cases has 
held that ‘a criminal conviction of a [Black defendant] cannot 
stand under the Equal Protection Clause if it is based on an 
indictment of a grand jury from which [Blacks] were excluded 
by reason of their race.’”104 Shoring up this precedent, 
Blackmun located inclusiveness in grand juries at the heart of 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection: 
“Discrimination on account of race . . . [is] the primary evil at 
which the . . . Fourteenth Amendment . . . [is] aimed,” and such 
discrimination is “especially pernicious in the administration of 
  
 98 439 U.S. 357, 366-68 (1979). 
 99 443 U.S. 545 (1979). 
 100 Id. at 560-61, 564. 
 101 Id. at 547-48 & n.2. 
 102 Id. at 549-50. 
 103 Id. at 550. 
 104 Id. at 551 (citing, inter alia, Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 394 (1881)). 
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justice.”105  Grand jury participation was, in Blackmun’s view, 
an element of democracy: “[t]he harm [of discrimination] is not 
only to the accused, indicted as he is by a jury from which a 
segment of the community has been excluded.  It is to society 
as a whole.”106  Such discrimination, Blackmun reasoned, is “at 
war with our basic concepts of a democratic society and a 
representative government” and it causes injury to “the law as 
an institution . . . and to the democratic ideal reflected in the 
processes of our courts.”107  To Blackmun, exclusion from a 
grand jury cut so deeply into the democratic fabric that it was a 
denial of equal protection in the plainest sense.   
Precisely because the problem of exclusion lay at the 
core of equal protection and of democracy itself, Blackmun 
rejected the argument, one first advanced by Justice Jackson in 
a 1950 dissent108 and urged in Rose by Justice Stewart, that so 
long as the trial itself was not defective, an improperly 
constituted grand jury could not be a basis for invalidating a 
conviction.109  Blackmun also rejected the state’s argument in 
Rose that, following Stone v. Powell110—in which the Court, 
with Blackmun in the majority, had held that where the state 
has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a 
Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner can not be granted 
habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained 
through an unconstitutional search and seizure was introduced 
at trial—because the trial itself was not defective, there should 
exist no habeas relief.111  Blackmun wrote in Rose that “a claim 
of discrimination . . . differs . . . fundamentally” from a claimed 
violation of the Fourth Amendment because “[a]llegations of 
grand jury discrimination involve charges that state officials 
are violating the direct command of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”112  Hence, Blackmun stated, the claim is properly 
presented in a habeas petition.113  The individual defendants in 
  
 105 Rose, 443 U.S. at 554-55. 
 106 Id. at 556. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. at 552 (citing Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 298 (1950) (Jackson, J., 
dissenting)). 
 109 Id. at 551-54. 
 110 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 
 111 443 U.S. at 559-64. 
 112 Id. at 560-61.  “This contrasts with the situation in Stone, where the Court 
considered application of ‘a judicially created remedy rather than a personal 
constitutional right.’”  Id. at 561-62 (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 495 n.37 
(1976)).   
 113 Id. at 564. 
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Rose were not, however, home free.  Reviewing the evidentiary 
record generated below, Blackmun disagreed with the Court of 
Appeals that the grand jury selection was defective and he 
concluded that there was insufficient evidence to make out a 
prima facie case of discrimination.114  The habeas petition 
therefore had to be denied.115
In the ensuing years, Blackmun’s view of juries as 
participatory institutions important to democracy 
strengthened.  In 1986, in Batson v. Kentucky,116 Blackmun was 
in the majority holding that in a criminal trial the Equal 
Protection Clause prohibits the prosecutor from using 
peremptory challenges to remove panelists on the basis of their 
race,117 and that the defendant may establish a prima facie case 
of discrimination based on the prosecutor’s use of peremptory 
challenges.118  Blackmun also dissented in two significant cases 
in which the majority refused to extend Batson.  In 1990, 
Blackmun dissented in Holland v. Illinois,119 in which the 
majority held that while the use of peremptory challenges to 
exclude potential jurors on the basis of their race violates the 
Equal Protection Clause, it does not violate the Sixth 
Amendment’s right to an impartial jury (the only argument the 
defendant in the case had raised at trial).120  In 1991, Blackmun 
dissented in Hernandez v. New York,121 in which the majority 
found no Batson violation in excluding Latino jurors on the 
ground that they might not accept the translator’s version of 
Spanish-language testimony.122  So too, in 1991, Blackmun 
joined Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Powers v. Ohio, 
holding that the Batson equal protection principle applies 
whether or not the defendant and the excluded juror are of the 
same race, so that in the trial of a White criminal defendant 
the prosecutor is prohibited from excluding Black jurors on the 
basis of their race.123  Blackmun also joined Kennedy’s majority 
  
 114 Id. at 564-74. 
 115 Id. at 574. 
 116 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 117 Id. at 89. 
 118 Id. at 93-95. 
 119 493 U.S. 474 (1990). 
 120 Id. at 486-88; see id. at 490 (Marshall, J. with Brennan, J. & Blackmun, J., 
dissenting). 
 121 500 U.S. 352 (1991). 
 122 Id. at 375 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 123 499 U.S. 400 (1991). 
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opinion in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,124 holding that 
equal protection also prohibits the use of peremptory 
challenges in a racially discriminatory manner in civil trials.125  
When civil parties in court exercise peremptory challenges, 
Kennedy held, they engage in state action: “If a government 
confers on a private body the power to choose the government’s 
employees or officials, the private body will be bound by the 
constitutional mandate of race neutrality.”126  On this view, 
race-based exclusion violates the equal protection rights of the 
excluded juror and the opposing party in the case has standing 
to challenge the exclusion.127   
In 1992, in Georgia v. McCollum,128 Blackmun, writing 
for a majority, extended the principle to the defendants in 
criminal trials, holding that they too are prohibited from 
exercising racially discriminatory peremptory challenges,129 
and that the prosecutor is entitled to assert the equal 
protection rights of the excluded juror to challenge a 
defendant’s decision.130  Whether a potential juror is excluded 
by the state or by the defendant, Blackmun reasoned, “the 
harm is the same—in . . . [each] case[] the juror is subjected to 
open and public racial discrimination,”131 and the racially 
discriminatory selection procedure “undermine[s] . . . public 
confidence” in the judicial process.132  Blackmun held that a 
criminal defendant’s use of peremptory challenges is, like the 
prosecutor’s, state action.133  He reasoned that state action 
exists because the peremptory challenge is a right established 
by state law;134 the jury process in general is a function of the 
government, which summons prospective jurors, administers to 
them an oath, and pays them a stipend;135 the jury in a criminal 
case performs a function—trial by jury—required by the 
Constitution;136 and the public views the jury process as a 
  
 124 500 U.S. 614 (1991). 
 125 Id. at 628. 
 126 Id. at 625. 
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 128 505 U.S. 42 (1992). 
 129 Id. at 50-55. 
 130 Id. at 56. 
 131 Id. at 49. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. at 51-56. 
 134 McCollum, 505 U.S. at 51. 
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governmental process.137  The fact that the defendant is on trial 
by the government does not undermine the conclusion that the 
defendant is the government when it comes to picking jurors.138  
Further, Blackmun found, applying the Equal Protection 
Clause to constrain the defendant’s exercise of peremptory 
challenges does not interfere with the defendant’s own right to 
a jury trial because all that the Sixth Amendment guarantees 
is the right to “trial by an impartial jury.”139  
The holding seems astonishing: the criminal defendant, 
the individual experiencing the fullest power of the state and 
mustering every resource to prevent what the state seeks to do, 
is, according to Blackmun, an agent of the government itself.  
Justice O’Connor, in dissent, calls the result “perverse.”140  And 
yet if the jury is a site of democracy, the holding makes perfect 
sense.  The jury does not exist for the benefit of the defendant 
but, rather, as an opportunity for citizen participation.  
Democracy therefore requires a response to efforts, including 
those by the defendant, to prevent citizens from participating 
fully. 
Democracy does not only mean equal participation on 
juries regardless of race.  In 1994, Blackmun also wrote the 
majority opinion in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.,141 holding 
that equal protection rules likewise apply to prohibit the use of 
peremptory challenges on the basis of gender.142 “[W]hether the 
trial is criminal or civil,” Blackmun wrote, “potential jurors, as 
well as litigants, have an equal protection right to jury 
selection procedures that are free from state-sponsored group 
stereotypes rooted in, and reflective of, historical prejudice.”143  
Treating the exclusion of women from juries as inconsistent 
with their right to vote,144 and at odds with “the value of 
women’s contribution to civic life,”145 Blackmun explained that 
women have suffered a similar plight as Blacks because, “with 
  
 137 Id. at 53. 
 138 Id. at 53-54 (noting that “[t]he exercise of a peremptory challenge differs 
significantly from other actions taken in support of a defendant’s defense”). 
 139 Id. at 58. 
 140 McCollum, 505 U.S. at 64 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 141 511 U.S. 127 (1994). 
 142 Id. at 128-29. 
 143 Id. at 128. 
 144 Id. at 131 (writing that “[m]any States continued to exclude women from 
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 145 Id. at 134. 
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respect to jury service . . . [both groups] share a history of total 
exclusion.”146  Using peremptory challenges to deny women an 
equal opportunity to serve on juries undermines their full 
participation in political life and renders them unequal 
citizens.  Blackmun wrote: 
Equal opportunity to participate in the fair administration of justice 
is fundamental to our democratic system. . . .  It reaffirms the 
promise of equality under the law—that all citizens, regardless of 
race, ethnicity, or gender, have the chance to take part directly in 
our democracy. . . .  When persons are excluded from participation in 
our democratic processes solely because of race or gender, this 
promise of equality dims, and the integrity of our judicial system is 
jeopardized.147
Exclusion of citizens from juries represents a defect in the very 
operations of democracy. 
IV.  CONCLUSION: MODERN LESSONS 
Blackmun’s understanding of juries as sites of political 
participation, though perhaps unusual in modern times,148 
turns out to be an old idea.  Blackmun’s view would be familiar 
to eighteenth-century Americans.  Alexander Hamilton in The 
Federalist identified the need to protect juries as an important 
component of American democracy and the single point of 
agreement among the diverse delegates to the Constitutional 
Convention: all of the convention delegates, Hamilton says, 
understood juries to be the “very palladium of free 
government.”149  The anti-federalist author of the 1788 Essays 
by a Farmer identified juries as “the democratic branch of the 
judiciary power.”150  Thomas Jefferson thought juries were 
more central to democracy than was the legislature, writing in 
1789 that “[w]ere I called upon to decide whether the people 
  
 146 Id. at 136. 
 147 J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 145-46 (footnote omitted). 
 148 Though it resonates broadly with the view of Justice Breyer—who replaced 
Blackmun in 1994—of the need in constitutional interpretation to consider the value of 
“active liberty,” by recognizing that “the people themselves should participate in 
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 149 THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 498 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter 
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 150 Essays by a Farmer (pt. 4), MD. GAZETTE, Mar. 21, 1788, reprinted in 5 THE 
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had best be omitted in the Legislative or Judiciary department, 
I would say it is better to leave them out of the Legislative.”151  
Alexis de Tocqueville also understood the participatory 
benefits of juries when he observed in the 1830s that “[t]he jury 
is both the most effective way of establishing the people’s rule 
and the most efficient way of teaching them how to rule.”152  
According to Tocqueville, “juries . . . instill some of the habits of 
the judicial mind into every citizen, and just those habits are 
the very best way of preparing people to be free.”153  Indeed, 
consistent with this view of juries as sites of democracy, in the 
early years of the Republic, instead of simply deciding well-
defined issues of fact, jurors also interpreted and applied the 
law.154
What might it mean to take seriously today the idea 
that juries are important because they are sites of democratic 
participation?  One implication is that the recent phenomenon, 
demonstrated by Marc Galanter and others, of the “vanishing” 
jury trial represents a significant erosion of democracy itself.  
In twenty-two state courts for which reliable data are 
available, between 1976 and 2002, the number of criminal 
cases decided by juries dropped from 42,000 cases out of 1.22 
million cases, to fewer than 36,000 out of 2.78 million cases; in 
other words, a decline of juries in 3.4% of criminal cases in 
1976 to 1.3% of criminal cases in 2002.155  In federal court 
today, juries resolve fewer than 3,000 cases out of the more 
than 75,000 criminal cases filed, about 4%.156  Civil juries are 
also disappearing.  While the civil-case load of the federal 
courts increased five-fold between 1962 and 2004, the number 
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(2003). 
2006] THE JUSTICE AND THE JURY 57 
of civil jury trials increased only modestly, from 2,765 to 3,006 
trials over the same period.157  In state courts, the absolute 
number of civil jury trials was one-third less in 2002 than it 
was in 1976.158  Each of these developments means that fewer 
and fewer Americans today have opportunities to participate 
on juries. 
Whatever the efficiencies of deciding cases without them 
going to jury trial, the decline of juries is a startling 
development.  Eighteenth-century Americans would consider a 
criminal jury trial rate of 4% as bizarre as Americans today 
would view a proposal to select just four United States senators 
through elections and the remaining 96 by, say, a Senatorial 
Selection Committee appointed by the President.  Or, put it 
this way: fewer than 40,000 juries deciding criminal matters 
today is equivalent—at a rate of twelve jurors per trial—to 
fewer than a half million citizens voting in national elections.  
If Blackmun is right about the participatory value of juries, it 
is democracy itself that is vanishing.   
A second implication, suggested by Blackmun’s opinion 
in Ballew, is the need for greater attention to the size of juries, 
and how size promotes or undermines participatory 
opportunities.  Ballew, citing social science research on group 
dynamics, tell us that juries comprised of fewer than six jurors 
do not work well as deliberative bodies.159  If six is the smallest 
size that does not lose participatory benefits, what is the 
largest sized jury that still works properly as a site of 
democracy?  Are twelve jurors—an accident of history—the 
right number?  Are there possibilities for increasing juries 
beyond twelve without undermining their benefits?  The issue 
matters for purposes of securing and increasing opportunities 
for jury service today.  When the number of juries called into 
action drops, making juries bigger may be one way to increase 
participation. 
In this same vein, Blackmun’s participatory theory of 
juries suggests that recent work by Robert Putnam and others 
tracking the disengagement of Americans, over the course of 
the past generation, from politics and other aspects of civic life 
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may be incomplete.160  Putnam presents a supply-side account 
of civic decline: Americans, increasingly consumed with private 
pursuits, have retreated from various forms of public 
participation.161  The evidence on juries suggests demand-side 
explanations may be more salient.  On this account, Americans 
do not participate in an important democratic institution, the 
jury, because with judges, lawyers and other professionals 
taking over their work, the services of ordinary people in the 
judicial system are no longer needed. 
Third, the democratic account of the jury suggests the 
need to think more broadly and creatively about the things 
juries might be entrusted to do—particularly in an age in 
which we do not ask them very frequently to decide cases at 
trial.  Juries might continue to contribute to democracy by 
playing a role in sentencing proceedings, in mediation and 
settlement, in discovery and other pre-trial disputes, and in the 
examination and acceptance of guilty pleas.162  So, too, jury-like 
panels outside of traditional courts—for example, community 
courts, drug courts, youth courts—represent additional 
participatory opportunities for citizens. 
Fourth, a participatory account of juries suggests, as 
Blackmun recognizes in McKeiver, Ludwig, and McCollum, 
that, in considering the uses, operations, and arrangements of 
juries, we, as a society, should focus less on how litigants want 
juries to look and function.  Our present system allows litigants 
in civil and criminal cases to forego jury trial altogether.  When 
juries are used, litigants, along with the judge, also exercise 
considerable control over them: deciding what they will hear, 
whether they can take notes, when they can come and go, what 
issues they will decide, and even when they can go to lunch or 
take a bathroom break.  A participatory account of juries 
suggests the need to align juries less with the demands and 
wishes of litigants and focus instead on ensuring juries 
enhance democracy. 
On that score, the jury as democracy suggests the need 
to end the practice of peremptory challenges—a point Justice 
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Marshall had suggested in Batson,163 and Justice O’Connor also 
raised in the J.E.B. case.164  There are, after all, no peremptory 
challenges at the ballot box so it is reasonable to ask why, if 
jurors are like voters, we tolerate peremptory strikes in the 
jury box.  Challenges for cause make sense: even some citizens 
are not permitted to vote (denying the vote to felons, for 
example, can be seen as a for-cause exclusion).  However, when 
juries are meant to be open for all citizens to participate, 
litigants should not be permitted to decide that some citizens 
should not play a role. 
Fifth, the participatory account of juries suggests also 
that the measure of successful jury performance should not be 
the accuracy of verdicts.  Again, a comparison to voting is 
instructive.  When elections are over, we may, and often do, 
wonder whether the voters have made wise choices.  But 
nobody asks whether voters in an election have made 
“accurate” choices.  So, too, we should be less obsessed with 
juror accuracy, and more appreciative of juries for their 
contributions to democracy. 
Finally, the participatory theory of juries suggests, as 
Blackmun understood, an important role for judges to ensure 
juries properly fulfill their democratic function.  In many ways, 
judges can and should monitor and structure the jury process—
ensuring juries are open, making sure jurors understand their 
task, even reviewing their work.  Just as judges have long 
played a role in correcting the undemocratic features of 
election, so too, judges can make sure democracy is served 
when citizens cast their votes in the jury room. 
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